Chapter 5: Evidence by Fields, Eileen M. et al.
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law







Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml
Part of the Evidence Commons
Recommended Citation
Fields, Eileen M.; McLeod, Kathleen M.; Rayel, Lisa; and Smith, Timothy M. (1985) "Chapter 5: Evidence," Annual Survey of




§ 5.1. Right to Show Witness Bias Outweighs Rape Complainant's Pri-
vacy Interests.* The defendant in a criminal prosecution is guaranteed, 
under the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution1 and article 
12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights,2 the right to confront an 
adverse witness. 3 The essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for 
the defendant a fair trial by providing the defendant with an opportunity 
to cross-examine the witness. 4 Cross-examination is the principal means 
to test the believability of the witness and the truth of the testimony.5 
This right of cross-examination includes not only the right to test the 
witness' perception and memory, but also permits the cross-examiner to 
impeach the witness. 6 
One method commonly used to impeach the credibility of an adverse 
witness is to reveal, either through cross-examination or by extrinsic 
testimony, that the witness is biased, prejudiced or has ulterior motives 
in testifying. 7 Cross-examination on the issue of bias is an essential part 
of the defendant's right to confront an adverse witness. 8 Refusal to allow 
cross-examination for the purpose of showing bias, therefore, may be 
reversible error that requires a new trial. 9 
In potential conflict with a defendant's right to show witness bias, 
however, is the trial judge's broad discretion to control the scope . of 
cross-examination pursuant to evidentiary rules. 10 Evidentiary rules are 
t Eileen M. Fields, Kathleen M. McLeod, Lisa Rayel, Timothy M. Smith. 
*Eileen M. Fields, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 5.1. 1 U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment provides in part: "In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him .... " I d. 
2 MAss. CoNST. art. XII. Article 12 provides in part: "And every subject shall have the 
right ... to meet the witnesses against him face to face .... " ld. 
3 Commonwealth v. Elliot, 393 Mass. 824, 828, 473 N.E.2d 1121, 1123-24 (1985). 
4 See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974). 
5 ld. at 316. 
6 ld. 
7 See McCoRMICK ON EviDENCE§ 40 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter McCoRMICK]. 
8 See P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 145 (5th ed. 1981). 
9 See id. at 145-46. 
10 See Davis, 415 U.S. at 316. 
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designed, in part, to exclude evidence where the prejudicial effect of 
such evidence is considered to outweigh its probative value, 11 where the 
evidence is cumulative, 12 or where the evidence relates to a collateral 
matter and admission of such evidence would unnecessarily distract the 
jury and prolong the trial. 13 In several instances, however, evidence may 
be admitted pursuant to the defendant's right to establish witness bias in 
spite of specific evidentiary rules which otherwise may be invoked to 
exclude such evidenceY The United States Supreme Court has stated, 
in Davis v. Alaska, 15 that where facts are relevant to a showing of bias, 
general evidentiary rules of exclusion must give way to the constitution-
ally based right of effective cross-examination. 16 This rationale has been 
followed by Massachusetts courts, which consider admitting such evi-
dence as prior arrests, 17 juvenile records18 and pending criminal 
indictments19 in situations where evidentiary rules otherwise would bar 
admission. Moreover, in recent cases involving rape assaults, the Su-
preme Judicial Court has admitted such evidence as specific instances of 
prior sexual conduct20 and prior false accusations of rape,21 despite the 
specific prohibition against such evidence included in the Massachusetts 
rape shield statute. 22 Where facts of a rape victim's sexual conduct are 
11 See McCoRMICK, supra note 8, § 185, at 544-47. 
12 See id. 
13 See id. 
14 Commonwealth v. Joyce, 382 Mass. 222, 231, 415 N.E.2d 181, 187 (1981). 
IS 415 U.S. 308 (1974). 
16 See Commonwealth v. Ferrara, 368 Mass. 182, 190, 330 N.E.2d 837, 843 (1975) (citing 
Davis, 415 U.S. at 320). 
17 Commonwealth v. Haywood, 377 Mass. 755, 760-61, 388 N.E.2d 648, 652 (1979) 
(evidence of arrest records where charges are pending against witness at time of his 
testimony may be admissible to show bias). 
18 Ferrara, 368 Mass. at 189, 330 N.E.2d at 842 (juvenile records may be admitted as 
evidence if they have a rational tendency to show bias of the witness). 
19 Commonwealth v. Hogan, 379 Mass. 190, 191, 396 N.E.2d 978, 979 (1979) (evidence 
of pending indictments against witness admissible as part of defendant's right to cross-
examine on issue of bias). 
211 Joyce, 382 Mass. at 230, 415 N.E.2d at 187 (1981) (evidence of specific instances of 
rape complainant's sexual conduct admissible when the evidence is relevant to show bias). 
21 Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 94-95, 378 N.E.2d 987, 991 (1978) (evi-
dence of prior false allegations of rape admissible on the issue of the complainant's credi-
bility). 
22 G.L. c. 233, § 21B. The rape shield statute provides in part: 
I d. 
Evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual conduct ... shall not be admis-
sible except evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with the defendant or evidence 
of recent conduct of the victim alleged to be the cause of any physical feature, 
characteristic, or condition of the victim .... If ... the court finds that the weight 
and relevancy of said evidence is sufficient to outweigh its prejudical effect to the 
victim, the evidence shall be admitted; otherwise not. 
2
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relevant to show bias, the Supreme Judicial Court has reasoned, the 
evidentiary prohibitions of the rape shield statute must not be construed 
to abridge the defendant's right to effective cross-examination.23 
During the Survey year, the Supreme Judicial Court, in Commonwealth 
v. Elliot, 24 considered whether the defendant's right to establish witness 
bias permitted cross-examination of a rape complainant concerning her 
financial situation and her stake in a civil action based on the criminal 
offense. The Court held that the trial judge erred in excluding such cross-
examination, which was designed to elicit evidence of the complainant's 
bias. 25 Moreover, because this error, according to the Court, was not 
harmless, the defendant was entitled to a new trial.26 The defendant's 
right to confront adverse witnesses through cross-examination designed 
to reveal possible bias, the Court noted, is guaranteed under both the 
federal and state constitutions.27 Thus, because questions concerning the 
witness' financial situation and her intentions to institute a civil suit based 
on a criminal offense were unquestionably relevant to the issue of the 
witness' credibility, the Court reasoned, these questions should have 
been admitted. 28 
In Elliot, the defendant was charged with rape and breaking and en-
tering a dwelling house at night with intent to commit a felony. 29 At the 
time of the alleged assault, the defendant was on parole from a rape 
conviction and was employed as a maintenance man by the complainant's 
landlord. 30 The complainant allegedly was in financial arrears at that time 
and was in the process of being evicted from her apartment. 31 In addition, 
charges were being brought against her by her landlord concerning an 
automobile accident in which she allegedly was the driver. 32 
On cross-examination of the complainant at trial, the defendant sought 
to impeach the complainant's credibility by probing into her possible 
financial motives for securing the defendant's conviction.33 Specifically, 
the defendant sought to elicit on cross-examination evidence of the com-
plainant's financial difficulties. 34 In addition, the defendant attempted to 
inquire into the complainant's possible intentions to bring an action 
23 Joyce, 382 Mass. at 229, 415 N.E.2d at 186. 
24 393 Mass. 824, 473 N .E.2d 1121 (1985). 
25 /d. at 828, 473 N.E.2d at ll23. 
26 /d. 
27 !d. at 828, 473 N.E.2d at ll23-24. 
28 /d. at 828-29, 473 N.E.2d at ll24. 
29 Id. at 824-25,473 N.E.2d at 1122. 
30 /d. at 825, 473 N .E.2d at 1122. 
3t /d. at 831, 473 N .E.2d at 1125. 
32 /d. at 826 n.2, 473 N.E.2d at ll23 n.2. 
33 /d. at 826, 473 N.E.2d at ll23. 
34 /d. 
3
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against her landlord, the defendant's employer, to recover compensation 
for the assault. 35 The defendant contended that, in view of the complain-
ant's financial difficulties and possible eviction from her apartment, the 
complainant's personal financial interests might have caused her to testify 
falsely in order to secure a guilty verdict in the criminal case, thereby 
potentially aiding her recovery in the civil case.36 The trial judge, how-
ever, excluded this line of questioning, reasoning that it improperly im-
peached the witness by introducing evidence of unrelated matters in order 
to show "bad character. "37 
On appeal, the defendant alleged, inter alia,38 that he was entitled to a 
new trial because the trial judge erred in excluding those questions in-
tended to show the complainant's bias. 39 The Supreme Judicial Court 
agreed that the defendant was entitled to a new trial, holding that the 
defendant had the right to cross-examine the rape complainant concerning 
both her financial difficulties and her intention to institute a civil action 
against her landlord.40 Notwithstanding the trial judge's ruling that the 
evidence was offered for the improper purpose of showing "bad charac-
ter," the Court held that this evidence was relevant to the issue of the 
complainant's possible bias. 41 Therefore, under the defendant's sixth 
amendment right to confront adverse witnesses in order to reveal possible 
biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives, the Court reasoned, the defendant 
must be allowed to pursue this line of questioning.42 The ability to cross-
examine rape complainants, the Court reasoned, may be the "'last refuge 
35 Id. at 827-28, 473 N.E.2d at 1123. 
36 I d. 
37 Id. at 826-27, 473 N.E.2d at 1123. Impeachment through proving bad character is a 
collateral issue in Massachusetts and cannot be proven by evidence of specific acts of 
"misconduct." See LIACOS, supra note 9, at 146-47. 
38 The defendant also alleged that he was entitled to a new trial on two other grounds. 
First, the defendant alleged that there was a conflict of interest on the part of the defendant's 
originally retained attorney due to his representation of the complainant in her subsequent 
civil action. Elliot, 393 Mass. at 825, 473 N.E.2d at 1122. The Court disagreed with this 
contention, finding that there was no conflict of interest because of the attorney's timely 
withdrawal from the case prior to the defendant's probable cause hearing. Id. at 832, 473 
N.E.2d at 1126. The defendant also alleged that the trial judge abused his discretion by 
allowing introduction into evidence for impeachment purposes the defendant's prior rape 
conviction. I d. at 825, 473 N.E.2d at 1122. The Court did not decide whether the trial judge 
had abused his discretion, however, in light of its holding that the defendant was entitled 
to a new trial on other grounds. ld. at 833, 473 N.E.2d at 1127. 
39 Id. at 825, 473 N.E.2d at 1122. 
40 ld. 
41 Id. at 828, 473 N.E.2d at 1124. 
42 Id. at 828, 473 N.E.2d at 1123-24. 
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of an innocent defendant. "'43 Accordingly, the Court concluded, the trial 
judge erred in excluding this line of questioning by the defendant. 44 
In granting the defendant a new trial, the Supreme Judicial Court 
rejected the Commonwealth's contention that although the trial judge did 
err in excluding the defendant's questions, such error was harmless and 
did not entitle the defendant to a new trial. 45 The Commonwealth con-
tended that since the record indicated that the complainant never consid-
ered the possibility of a civil suit until after the criminal trial was over, 
the complainant's testimony in response to the defendant's cross-exam-
ination would not have had a material effect on the jury. 46 The Court 
rejected this reasoning, noting that since the complainant never actually 
testified as to when she first considered the possibility of pursuing a civil 
claim, neither the Court nor the trial judge could know with certainty 
how the complainant might have answered the defendant's questions.47 
The Supreme Judicial Court also rejected the Commonwealth's argu-
ment that, since equivalent information had reached the jury through 
alternate means, exclusion of the defendant's cross-examination was 
harmless error. 48 The Court noted that while the jury did hear some 
testimony about the complainant's financial difficulties,49 the defendant 
was not allowed to cross-examine the complainant about these matters 
or about her civil suit, and therefore, the jury was not given a sufficient 
basis to discern the possible bias or financial motive of the complainant. 50 
Only when equivalent information is communicated to the jury or the 
excluded testimony is cumulative, the Court concluded, may the trial 
43 /d. at 828, 473 N .E.2d at 1124 (quoting Joyce, 382 Mass. at 229, 415 N .E.2d at 186). 
44 Id. at 834, 473 N.E.2d at 1127. 
45 Id. at 828, 473 N.E.2d at 1123. 
46 Id. at 829, 473 N.E.2d at 1124. 
47 /d. at 829-30 & 829 n.3, 473 N .E.2d at 1124-25 & 1124 n.3. The Elliot Court also noted 
that uncertainty over when the complainant first entertained the idea of bringing a civil suit 
distinguished this case from the Court's earlier decision in Haywood. /d. at 830, 473 N .E.2d 
at 1125 (discussing Commonwealth v. Haywood, 377 Mass. 755, 388 N.E.2d 648 (1979)). 
In Haywood, the Court upheld the exclusion of the witness' arrest records where the arrests 
occurred after the witness' initial statements incriminating the defendant. 377 Mass. at 763, 
388 N.E.2d at 654. The Elliot Court noted that the witness' testimony in Haywood clearly 
predated any incentive he might have had to falsify his testimony in order to seek govern-
ment favor because of his subsequent arrests. Elliot, 393 Mass. at 830, 473 N .E.2d at 1125. 
Thus, the Elliot Court reasoned, unlike the trial judge in Haywood who correctly excluded 
questions concerning the witness' subsequent arrests, the trial judge in Elliot incorrectly 
excluded questions which may have revealed the witness' prior intentions to commence a 
civil suit. Id. 
48 Elliot, 393 Mass. at 831,473 N.E.2d at 1125. 
49 /d. The jury did hear witnesses testify that at the time of the assault the complainant 
was in financial arrears, she was in the process of being evicted and her account with the 
telephone company was delinquent. Id. 
"'Id. 
5
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judge's decision to exclude questions designed to impeach a witness' 
credibility be harmless, and therefore irreversible, error. 51 Thus, the 
Court concluded, since the trial judge's exclusion of questions designed 
to demonstrate bias of the rape complainant could not be termed harmless 
error, the defendant was entitled to a new trial. 
Although the Elliot Court expressed awareness of the legislative con-
cern for the rape complainant, as evidenced by the Massachusetts rape 
shield statute enacted in 1977,52 the Court correctly indicated that, in the 
circumstances of this case, the rape complainant's financial privacy in-
terests were outweighed by the defendant's constitutional rights to cross-
examination. In Elliot, the defendant sought to introduce evidence of the 
rape complainant's financial difficulties and her intention to institute a 
civil suit. This type of evidence does not undermine the rape shield 
statute, which was enacted to prevent the rape victim from experiencing 
trauma, invasion of privacy, jury prejudice and character assassination 
as a result of admitting evidence of the victim's reputation for unchastity 
or specific instances of prior sexual conduct. 53 Evidence of a civil suit 
based on a criminal offense is admissible because it is gender-neutral 
evidence which has a rational tendency to show specific bias on the part 
of the witness, unlike evidence of prior sexual conduct, which may be 
inadmissible because it is an element "'of a legal tradition, established 
by men, that the complaining woman in a rape case is fair game for 
character assassination in open court.' "54 
Moreover, the Supreme Judicial Court has stated, in Commonwealth 
v. Joyce/5 that even evidence of a rape victim's sexual history may be 
admissible under the sixth amendment, notwithstanding the rape shield 
51 ld. at 831-32, 473 N.E.2d at 1125-26. The necessity of providing the jury with equiv-
alent information before exclusion of evidence may be ruled harmless error was stressed 
by the Court in a decision later in the Survey year. In Commonwealth v. Rodwell, 394 
Mass. 694, 477 N.E.2d 385 (1985), the Supreme Judicial Court upheld exclusion of evidence 
of the pro~ecution witness' past cooperation with the Commonwealth since this evidence, 
although relevant to the issue of bias, was cumulative. The Court noted that the jury already 
had more compelling evidence of the witness' potential bias through disclosure of the seven 
criminal charges pending against the witness. ld. at 700, 477 N.E.2d at 389. 
52 G.L. c. 233, § 21B. 
53 See Case Comment, Massachusetts Rape Shield Statute: The Need to Balance the 
Defendant's Constitutional Rights with Victim Protections-Commonwealth v. Joyce, 15 
SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1023, 1023 (1981). 
54 Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376 Mass. 90, 95,378 N.E.2d 987,991-92 (1978) (quoting 
Commonwealth v. Manning, 367 Mass. 605, 613-14, 328 N.E.2d 496, 501 (1975) (Braucher, 
J., dissenting)); see also Commonwealth v. Dutra, 15 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 542, 549, 
446 N.E.2d 1091, 1097 (1983) (evidence of civil suit relevant to the issue of rape victim's 
credibility); Commonwealth v. Carty, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 793, 795, 397 N.E.2d 1138, 1140 
(1979) (evidepce of rape complainant's probationary status admissible to show bias). 
55 382 Mass. 222, 415 N.E.2d 181 (1981). 
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statute, when such evidence is relevant to demonstrate bias or motive to 
lie. 56 Although the trial judge should consider the important policies 
underlying the rape shield statute, as the Joyce Court advised,57 the trial 
judge should exclude evidence of specific instances of sexual conduct 
only to the extent that such exclusion does not unduly infringe upon the 
defendant's right to show bias. Thus, as the Supreme Judicial Court has 
held, reasonable cross-examination for the purpose of showing bias and 
prejudice of the witness is a protected right which outweighs other inter-
ests of the state and the rape victim, and which should be limited, but 
not excluded, within the discretion of the trial judge. 
In sum, the Elliot decision is significant in two respects. First, it 
displays the continued vitality of the defendant's confrontation clause 
right to demonstrate witness bias and second, it emphasizes the impor-
tance of that right. The defendant is guaranteed the right to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses to reveal possible biases, prejudices or ulterior mo-
tives. Moreover, this right supercedes general evidentiary rules, and 
specific rules such as the rape shield statute, which otherwise limit the 
scope of cross-examination. Accordingly, the Elliot Court recognized that 
in a rape prosecution, the defendant has a right to probe into the insti-
tution of a civil suit by the victim and into her financial difficulties, since 
this evidence can create a financial motive for the victim to testify falsely 
in order to secure a conviction which would aid in her quest for civil 
monetary damages. 
§ 5.2. Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege.* For more than a cen-
tury, the issue of whether a witness waives the attorney-client privilege 
by testifying has troubled the Massachusetts courts. 1 One line of deci-
sions, beginning with Woburn v. Henshaw in 1869, holds that a witness 
who testifies at trial automatically waives the attorney-client privilege. 2 
The Woburn line of decisions reasons that once a client agrees to testify, 
he or she "makes himself liable to full cross-examination like any other 
56 /d. at 230, 415 N.E.2d at 187. For a discussion of Joyce, see Augustyn, Evidence, 1981 
ANN. SURV. MASS. LAW§ 5.2, at 127. 
57 Joyce, 382 Mass. at 231, 415 N.E.2d at 188. See Tanford & Bocchino, Rape Victim 
Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 544 (1980) (concluding that 
rape shield statutes violate the sixth amendment). 
*Kathleen M. McLeod, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 5.2. 1 See Neitlich v. Peterson, 15 Mass. App. Ct. 622, 626-27, 447 N.E.2d 671, 673-
74 (parallel and inconsistent lines of decisions govern selective assertion of privilege). See 
P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 215 (5th ed. 1981) [hereinafter 
LIAcos]; Spalding, The Uncertain State of the Law as to Waiver of Professional Privilege 
as to Confidential Communications, 20 MASS. L.Q. no. 3, 16 (1935). 
2 101 Mass. 193 (1869). 
7
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witness. "3 The contrary line of cases, holding that a witness's testimony 
is not a de facto waiver of the attorney-client privilege, began in 1874 
with Montgomery v. Pickering. 4 This line of cases reasons that a witness 
waives the privilege only when the subject matter of that witness's tes-
timony is within the specific context of a cited confidential communica-
tion.5 
Courts also have wrestled repeatedly with whether a defendant may 
consent to representation by counsel with divided loyalties.6 This issue 
is particularly troublesome when the privilege-bound attorney must cross-
examine a former client pertaining to a privileged matter. Balancing the 
defendant's sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel with 
the defendant's right to representation by counsel of his or her choice, 
courts occasionally have disqualified the conflict-hindered attorney. 7 In 
United States v. Dolan,8 for example, the Court of Appeals for the Third 
Circuit concluded that the defendant's attorney was properly disqualified 
because he could not effectively cross-examine his former client, an 
important prosecution witness, without "intruding into matters protected 
by the attorney-client privilege."9 The Third Circuit, stressing the court's 
"supervisory authority over members of the bar to enforce the ethical 
standard requiring an attorney to decline multiple representation,"10 held 
that the district court properly refused to accept the defendant's waiver 
of his right to the effective assistance of counsel. Thus, waiver of the 
3 /d. at 200. The Supreme Judicial Court in Woburn ruled that "[t]he policy of the law 
will not allow the counsel himself to make disclosures of confidential communications from 
his client; but if the client sees fit to be a witness, he makes himself liable to full cross-
examination like any other witness." /d. See also Knowlton v. Fourth-Atlantic Nat'! Bank, 
264 Mass. 181, 196, 162 N.E. 356, 360-61 (1928); Gossman v. Rosenberg, 237 Mass. 122, 
124, 129 N.E. 424, 425-26 (1921); Commonwealth v. Barronian, 235 Mass. 364, 367, 126 
N.E. 833, 834 (1920). 
4 116 Mass. 227, 231 (1874). 
5 See McCooe v. Dighton Somerset & Swansea St. Ry., 173 Mass. 117, 119, 53 N.E. 
133, 134 (1899). Montgomery was followed in McCooe and more recently by implication 
in Kendall v. Atkins, 374 Mass. 320, 325, 372 N.E.2d 764, 767 (1978). The position taken 
in Montgomery was also the view adopted by Proposed Mass. R. Evid. 510 (1980), which 
provided that a privilege against disclosure is waived if the holder of the privilege "volun-
tarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter." 
/d. reprinted in LIACOS, supra note I, at 215. 
6 See, e.g., United States v. Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1004-05 (3d Cir. 1980); United 
States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1183-84 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Kitchin, 592 F.2d 
900, 904 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (adopting district court's findings and conclusions), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979). 
7 See cases cited in note 6, supra. 
8 570 F.2d 1177 (3d Cir. 1978). 
9 !d. at 1183-84. 
10 Id. at 1184. 
8
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attorney-client privilege has compelling ethical, as well as evidentiary, 
implications. 
The principles set forth by the United States Supreme· Court in Johnson 
v. Zerbst 11 govern both waiver of the attorney-client privilege and waiver 
of the right to conflict-free counsel. Zerbst requires that one's waiver of 
a constitutional right be an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right. "12 Thus to be valid, a witness's waiver of the attorney-
client privilege, and a defendant's waiver of the right to unhindered 
counsel, must be voluntary, knowing and intentional. 13 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Goldman, 14 the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether a witness automat-
ically waives the attorney-client privilege when he or she takes the stand 
to testify. 15 Resolving a century old conflict, the Court held that a wit-
ness's testimony regarding an event which happened to have been the 
topic of a conversation between a client and his or her attorney, rather 
than testimony regarding the actual content of the substance of the at-
torney-client consultation, is not a per se waiver of the privilege. 16 The 
Goldman Court also addressed whether a defendant may consent to 
representation by a privilege-bound attorney. 17 The Court found that if 
the defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently consents he or she 
may relinquish the right to an attorney with undivided loyalty. 18 
In Commonwealth v. Goldman, the defendant, Lawrence Goldman, 
was charged with conspiracy to murder former Boston Police Officer 
John Glenn. 19 Soon after Goldman's attorney, Davis, agreed to represent 
the defendant it became apparent to Davis that Glenn would be called as 
a witness at Goldman's triai.2° Glenn's testimony at Goldman's trial, 
however, presented a conflict of interest to Davis as counsel because 
Glenn was a former client of Davis. 21 
Davis's association with Glenn began in January, 1982, shortly after 
11 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Supreme Court in Zerbst asserted that courts should indulge 
'"every reasonable presumption against waiver' of [a] fundamental constitutional [right]." 
ld. at 464. 
12 Id. 
13 Goldman, 395 Mass. at 507, 480 N.E.2d at 1031 (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 
u.s. 742, 748 (1970)). 
14 395 Mass. 495, 480 N.E.2d 1023 (1985). 
15 Id. at 498, 480 N.E.2d at 1026. 
16 Id. at 499-500, 480 N.E.2d at 1027. 
17 Id. at 505-07, 480 N.E.2d at 1030-31. 
18 Jd. at 498, 480 N.E.2d at 1026. 
19 Id. at 496, 480 N.E.2d at 1025. 
20 The Commonwealth believed that Glenn was hired by the defendant to murder an 
individual named Leo Shorter. ld. 
21 Id. 
9
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Glenn was indicted for assault with intent to murder an individual named 
Leo Shorter. 22 Glenn met with Davis regarding the possibility of retaining 
him as counseJ.23 Glenn discussed the indictment with Davis and dis-
closed confidential information to Davis regarding his case. 24 They 
reached no agreement concerning representation and in fact Glenn was 
not represented by Davis at trial. 25 
Davis's representation of the defendant began in June 1982, or shortly 
thereafter, when a grand jury indicted Goldman for conspiracy to murder 
Glenn. 26 The Commonwealth alleged that the defendant conspired with 
a co-defendant to kill Glenn because Glenn had failed to murder Shorter. 27 
Subsequent to his conviction in March 1983, Glenn began to cooperate 
with the Quincy police concerning his association with the defendant. 28 
Principally, Glenn had given statements regarding the attempted murder 
of Leo Shorter. 29 Davis, as Goldman's defense counsel was furnished 
with a transcript of the statements Glenn made to the Quincy police. 30 
The statements Glenn made to the Quincy police were "diametrically 
opposed" to the statements Glenn made to Davis shortly after his indict-
ment in January, 1982.31 
Glenn would be a key witness for the prosecution in the case against 
Goldman, and as such, his credibility would be a central issue in the 
forthcoming Goldman trial.32 If Glenn were to testify in accordance with 
his post-conviction statements to the Quincy police and Davis were to 
cross-examine him regarding those statements his credibility could be 
greatly diminished because Glenn's testimony at trial would be inconsis-
tent with the statements he had made during his consultation with Davis. 33 
Accordingly, Glenn invoked, and consistently refused to waive, the at-
torney-client privilege with respect to his conversation with Mr. Davis. 34 
Cognizant of the potential conflict of interest associated with cross-





26 ld. Ultimately Glenn was convicted in the Superior Court in Norlolk County. Id. 
Glenn's sentencing was postponed until after his testimony for the Commonwealth in its 
case against Goldman. Id. at 496, 480 N.E.2d at 1025-26. 
27 Id. at 496, 480 N.E.2d at 1025. Shorter apparently had cheated Goldman in a drug 
deal. ld. 
28 ld. at 496-97, 480 N.E.2d at 1026. 
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filed a motion in limine35 seeking a pretrial ruling on the attorney~client 
privilege issue.36 Pursuant to Davis's motion, the superior court held a 
hearing at which Davis testified as to the substance of his conversation 
with Glenn. 37 Based on the testimony and exhibits offered, the judge 
found that a witness does not waive the attorney-client privilege when 
that witness takes the stand at trial and testifies regarding events which 
are the subject matter of trial, but specifically refuses to waive the priv~ 
ilege as to confidential communications. 38 The judge concluded that the 
facts and circumstances of the Goldman case did not require her to 
override the attorney-client privilege. 39 The lower court did, however, 
require Davis to withdraw as counsel to Goldman due to the conflict of 
interest inherent in his continued representation of the defendant.40 The 
court further held that the defendant could not consent to counsel's 
continued representation. 41 
Defendant appealed the trial court's ruling to the appeals court and 
filed a petition for direct appellate review.42 This request was later granted 
by the Supreme Judicial Court.43 Justice Liacos, writing for the Court, 
held that Glenn's testimony would not operate as a de facto waiver of 
the attorney-client privilege which protected the statements Glenn made 
to Davis during the initial consultation. 44 Further, the Court ruled that 
although Davis' representation of the defendant was tainted by a conflict 
of interest which might require his withdrawal, Goldman could continue 
to be represented by Davis provided Goldman "voluntarily, knowingly 
and intelligently" consented.45 The Supreme Judicial Court vacated the 
superior court's order which required Mr. Davis to withdraw and re~ 
manded the case to the superior court for further consideration. 
The Goldman Court reasoned that the determination whether a witness 
waives his or her privilege turns on whether the witness's testimony 
concerns "the specific content of an identified privileged communica• 
tion,"46 or merely is about "events which happen to have been a topic of 
35 In limine is the latin term meaning "on or at the threshold; at the very beginning; 
preliminarily." BLACKS LAW DICTiONARY 708 (5th ed. 1979). See generally Redding v. 
Ferguson, 501 S.W.2d 717, 722 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (purpose of motion in limine is to 
avoid introduction into trial of matters which "are irrelevant, inadmissible and prejudicial"). 
36 Goldman, 395 Mass. at 496, 480 N.E.2d at 1025. 
37 Id. at 497-98, 480 N.E.2d at 1026. 
1s Id. at 497, 480 N.E.2d at 1026. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 498, 480 N.E.2d at 1026. 
•• Id. 
42 Id. at 496, 480 N.E.2d at 1025. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. at 498, 480 N.E.2d at 1026. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 500, 480 N.E.2d at 1027 (emphasis added). 
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a privileged communication. "47 According to the Court, when a witness 
testifies regarding the specific content of an identified attorney-client 
consultation the witness waives the privilege.48 The court ruled, however, 
that when the witness's testimony is limited to an event that the witness 
had occasion to discuss during the course of a confidential communica-
tion, that the witness does not automatically waive the attorney-client 
privilege. 49 
The Goldman Court also refused to find that the interests of justice 
required the attorney-client privilege to be overridden in those instances 
where the witness/former client cooperates with the prosecution. 50 The 
defendant argued that an accomplice who aids the police by favorable 
and often self-incriminating, testimony automatically waives the attorney-
client privilege. 51 The defendant advanced that the basis for the privilege 
ends when, by testifying, one exposes himself or herself to the very 
consequences that the privilege was intended to prevent. 52 The Court 
rejected this argument and stated that the attorney-client privilege serves 
the "interest of the administration of justice. "53 The attorney-client priv-
ilege, held the Court, has a dual purpose. First, the privilege protects a 
client's disclosures to an attorney which the client would not have made 
in the absence of the privilege.54 Second, the privilege enables the attor-
ney to give well informed advice by encouraging clients to both seek 
advice from, and be honest with, their attorney. 55 Finding that these 
important public policy aspects would not be compromised, the Court 
held that Glenn would not automatically waive the attorney-client privi-
lege by testifying at Goldman's trial, and that the facts of Goldman did 
not require that the attorney-client privilege be overridden. 56 
The Supreme Judicial Court next discussed the ethical considerations 
47 /d. at 499-500, 480 N.E.2d at 1027 (emphasis added). 
48 /d. at 500, 480 N.E.2d at 1027. 
49 ld. at 499-500, 480 N.E.2d at 1027. 
'
0 /d. at 501-02, 480 N.E.2d at 1028. 
"/d. at 501, 480 N.E.2d at 1028. 
'
2 /d. The Court denounced the reasoning of the Mississippi Supreme Court in Jones v. 
State, 65 Miss. 179, 184, 3 So. 379, 380 (1887). 
"Goldman, 395 Mass. at 502, 480 N.E.2d at 1029. 
"Id. at 502, 480 N.E.2d at 1028. 
"/d. at 502, 480 N.E.2d at 1028-29. 
'
6 /d. at 498, 480 N.E.2d at 1026. The Court adopted the rule stated in Wigmore's treatise 
on evidence: 
The client's offer of his own testimony in the cause at large is not a waiver for the 
purpose either of cross-examining him to communications or of calling the attorney 
to prove them. Otherwise the privilege of consultation would be exercised only at 
the penalty of closing the client's own mouth on the stand. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 
§ 2327, at 637 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis in original). 
/d. at 502, 480 N.E.2d at 1029. 
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underlying Davis's representation of Goldman and his necessary cross-
examination of Glenn. 57 The Court noted that an attorney's successive 
representation of clients with conflicting interests is compromised in two 
ways. First, counsel must affirmatively avoid using any information ob-
tained from the first client during their privileged communication. 58 Next, 
counsel's defense and advocacy of his second client's case subcon-
sciously may be inhibited.59 In this regard, the Court stated that "'[t]he 
conflict ... in the attorney's own mind may have unmeasurable adverse 
effects on the client's interests. "'60 Due to the conflict of interest inherent 
in Davis's cross-examination of Glenn, the Goldman Court concluded 
that unless the defendant waives his right to be represented by counsel 
with undivided loyalty, Mr. Davis would be required to withdraw as 
defense counsel. 61 
Turning to the issue of whether a client may waive the right to unin-
hibited representation, the Court first recognized that the sixth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution grants to the defendant a right to 
representation which is "untrammeled and unimpaired . . . free of any 
conflict of interest and unrestricted by commitments to others. "62 The 
Court further noted that the defendant has a right to present a defense 
and be represented by counsel of his or her choice. 63 Balancing the 
individual's right to effective assistance of counsel against the individual's 
right to be represented by counsel of his or her choice, the Court found 
that the defendant may waive the right to a conflict-free attorney. 64 
Next, the Court addressed the question of whether the defendant may 
knowingly and intelligently waive his or her right to the undivided loyalty 
of counsel when his attorney ethically may not reveal any substance of 
the privileged conversation.65 The Court rejected the trial court's reason-
ing that without the benefit of the privileged, and therefore undisclosable, 
information the defendant cannot make "a 'knowing and intelligent' 
waiver. "66 Rather, the Court concluded that the defendant did not need 
to know the exact substance of the privileged communication to make 
57 Id. at 503-08, 480 N.E.2d at 1029-32. 
58 Id. at 503, 480 N.E.2d at 1029. 
59 Id. at 504, 480 N.E.2d at 1030. 
60 Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rondeau, 378 Mass. 408, 416 n.7, 392 N.E.2d 1001, 
1006 n. 7 (1979)). 
61 Id. at 505, 480 N.E.2d at 1030. 
62 Id. at 505, 480 N.E.2d at 1030 (quoting Commonwealth v. Davis, 376 Mass. 777, 780-
81, 384 N.E.2d 181, 185 (1978)); see Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 76 (1942). 
63 Goldman, 396 Mass. at 505-06, 480 N.E.2d at 1031. 
64 Id. at 505-06, 480 N.E.2d at 1030-31. 
65 Id. at 506, 480 N.E.2d at 1031. 
66 Id. 
13
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an informed decision as to Davis's representation.67 The Court stated 
that in the instant case, the attorney presumptively would notify the 
defendant that Glenn's statements on the stand were likely to be "dia-
metrically opposed" to his earlier privileged communication.68 As are-
sult, the Court found, the defendant would be capable of making a 
reasonably accurate assessment of the impact of the conflict on his at-
torney's represl!ntation. 69 
The Goldman Court then offered some guidelines for a valid waiver of 
the right to effective assistance of counsel. The Court first emphasized 
the presumption against waiver of constitutional rights set forth by the 
United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Zerbst.1° Relying on the 
principles set forth in Zerbst, the Goldman Court stated that such valid 
waiver must be not only voluntary, but also a "knowing, intelligent act 
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely 
consequences. "71 The Court then stressed that the trial judge should play 
an active role in the defendant's waiver decision. 72 The Court stated the 
judge should require that the defendant be fully informed of the attorney's 
conflict of interest and its potential impact on his or her defense. 73 Other 
factors the Goldman Court considered important in the waiver decision 
included the defendant's "background, experience and conduct"74 and 
the "integrity of the entire adversary system. "75 Although the Court 
recognized that the public has a fundamental interest in the fair, proper 
and swift iidministration of justice, the Court concluded that the defen-
dant's right to choose his or her own counsel will prevail, provided the 
defendant's decision to be represented by a conflict-bound attorney is 
"voluntary, knowing and intelligent."76 Practically, the Goldman Court 
advised a discussion between the judge and the defendant to insure that 
the defendant under~tands his or her rights and waives them knowingly. 77 
A written record of the waiver dialogue which is "clear, unequivocal, 
and unambiguous" should be made, the Court suggested, to safeguard 





70 ld. at 507, 480 N.E.2d at 1031. See supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text. 
71 ld. (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970)). 
72 Jd. at 507-08, 480 N.E.2d at 1031-32. 
73 Jd. at 507, 480 N.E.2d at 1031-32. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court's decision in Goldman is consistent with 
the approach followed by other jurisdictions. 79 The Court recognized that 
the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to preserve the confiden-
tiality of information. 80 The Goldman Court further stressed that the 
privilege continues even after the threat of punishment disappears. 81 Thus 
the Supreme Judicial Court, by allowing the attorney-client privilege to 
be waived only to the extent that the witness's testimony concerns the 
substance of the privileged communication, preserves and furthers the 
purpose of the attorney-client privilege. 
The Court in deciding the Goldman case, however, loosely construed 
the requisites for a valid waiver of the right to effective assistance of 
counsel. Although the Court underscored the presumption against waiver 
of constitutionaf rights as set forth by the United States Supreme Court 
in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court nonetheless ruled that the "defendant 
need not know the exact content of the privileged communication to 
make an informed decision."82 How a defendant's rights can be served 
by the application of this rule is far from clear. A question remains 
whether one can make an informed waiver of the constitutional right to 
the effective assistance of counsel when one cannot be informed com-
pletely as to the content of the privilegeq communication. It is difficult 
to conceive of a client being made thoroughly aware of all of the potential 
deleterious effects which may flow from representation by an attorney 
with divided loyalties without the benefit of knowing the precise nature 
of his or her counsel's conflicting loyalties. Such precise knowledge 
cannot be gained without receiving disclosure of the privileged informa-
tion. 
The Court's analysis of the consent to counsel issue in Goldman 
stressed the manner in which the waiver of the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel can best be preserved for appeal, 83 rather than the 
79 See, e.g., People v. Lynch, 23 N.Y.2d 262, 271, 244 N.E.2d 29, 34-35, 296 N.Y.S.2d 
327, 334, (1%8) ("testimony about an event ... should not be construed as a waiver of 
the privilege, merely because the subject matter of the testimony may also have been 
discussed in the privileged communication"); People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453,457-60, 126 
N.E.2d 559, 561-62 (1955) (waiver of the attorney-client privilege should not be implied 
from a witness taking the stand); Littlefield v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 477, 483-
85, 186 Cal. Rptr. 368, ~71-72 (1982) (testimony of witness as to facts does not waive 
substance of the conversation with his lawyer); cf Dunn v. Commonwealth, 350 S.W.2d 
709, 713 (Ky. 1961) ("the protection afforded by the [attorney-client privilege] is for the 
client's exclusive benefit and if the privileged communication, which is precluded in the 
attorney's direct testimony, can be obtained indirectly by cross-examination of the client, 
then the privilege ... would be worthless"). 
80 See Goldman, 395 Mass. at 501 n.7, 400 N.E.2d at 1028 n.7. 
81 See id. at 501-02, 480 N.E.2d at 1028. 
82 Id. at 506, 480 N.E.2d at 1031. 
83 Id. at 507-08, 480 N.E.2d at 1031-32. The Court state4: 
15
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defendant's right to make intelligent and well-informed decisions regard-
ing his or her criminal defense. Consequently, the Court failed to accord 
proper weight to the countervailing ethical considerations surrounding 
Davis's representation of the defendant Goldman. The lower court re-
quired that counsel withdraw from the case based on its determination 
that Goldman could not give a valid and knowing consent to Davis's 
representation. In requiring Davis to withdraw, the trial court was exer-
cising its supervisory powers over the members of the bar. 84 Moreover, 
Davis, as a member of the bar, was bound to the ABA Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. Disciplinary Rule 5-105 requires that an attorney 
refuse to accept or continue employment if the interests of another client 
might impair the attorney's independent professional judgment.85 In ad-
dition, Canon 9 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility states 
that a lawyer must avoid giving the appearance of impropriety. 86 The 
facts and circumstances of the Goldman case, particularly since a mem-
ber of the Boston Police Department was implicated in a capital offense, 
suggest that the Supreme Judicial Court should have given more weight 
to the ethical considerations attendant to attorney Davis's representation 
of the defendant, Goldman. By loosely construing the conditions neces-
sary for a valid waiver of the right to conflict-free counsel, the Goldman 
Court may have undermined the high level of professional ethics to which 
we aspire in the Commonwealth. Had Davis not accepted Goldman as a 
client from the start, thereby complying with the spirit and letter of 
Disciplinary Rule 5-105 of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, 
the Supreme Judicial Court would not have been confronted with the 
troublesome task of balancing Goldman's right to effective assistance of 
counsel against his right to counsel of his choice. 
In sum, in Commonwealth v. Goldman the Court resolved the conflict 
in Massachusetts law regarding the continued existence of attorney-client 
privilege when a witness takes the stand to testify. The Court held that 
the attorney-client privilege is not waived when the witness testifies as 
to certain events which took place and happened to be the topic of a 
privileged communication. The Court also applied the rule of non-waiver 
to instances where the witness selectively cooperates with the Common-
wealth in a criminal prosecution and ruled that justice does not require 
/d. 
A record of the waiver colloquy between the defendant and the judge should be 
made in which the language of the waiver is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous. 
Such a record should help shield any potential conviction from collateral attack on 
Sixth Amendment grounds. 
84 See Dolan, 570 F.2d at 1184. 
85 ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-105(A). 
86 Id. Canon 9. 
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the attorney-client privilege be overridden. The Court noted, however, 
that waiver of the privilege may be found when the witness testifies as 
to the specific content of his or her conversation with counsel. Finally, 
the Court ruled that a criminal defendant can waive the right to an 
attorney unhindered by conflict of interest without knowledge of the exact 
nature of the privileged communication. 
§ 5.3. Substantial Risk of Miscarriage of Justice-Aggregation of Preju-
dicial Errors.* In Massachusetts, a criminal defendant is not entitled to 
appellate review of alleged errors occurring at trial unless the defendant 
preserves his or her right to a review by proper objection below.' Rule 
22 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure sets forth the re-
quirements for preserving an issue for appellate review by proper objec-
tion at trial. 2 Requiring proper objection to preserve the right of appellate 
review ensures that an alleged error is brought clearly to the judge's 
attention, allowing the judge to consider and decide the issue and rectify 
the error. 3 In addition, courts require proper objection below to prevent 
*Lisa Rayel, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW. 
§ 5.3. 1 Counsel must make an objection if he or she wishes to preserve an issue for 
review. 
Exceptions to rulings or orders of the court are unnecessary and for all purposes for 
which an exception has heretofore been necessary, it is sufficient that a party, at the 
time the ruling or order of the court is made or sought, makes known to the court 
the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the 
court, but if a party has no opportunity to object to a ruling or order, the absence 
of an objection does not thereafter prejudice him. 
If a party objects to a ruling or order of the court, he may state the precise legal 
grounds of his objection, but he shall not argue or further discuss such grounds 
unless the court calls upon him for such argument or discussion. 
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 22. Rule 22 restates Rule 51 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
and is substantially similar to Rule 46 of both the Massachusetts and Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 51; MAss. R. Civ. P. 46; FED. R. Civ. P. 46. 
2 Rule 22 eliminated the necessity of counsel claiming an exception in order to obtain 
appellate review. K.B. SMITH, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 30A MASS. PRACTICE 
SERIES §§ 1772, 1774 (2d ed. 1983). To preserve an issue for review, Rule 22 requires that 
counsel object at an appropriate time to action or inaction of the judge. ld. at § 1775. The 
objection should be made at the time that the ruling or order of the judge is made. I d. at 
§ 1776. If a party desires the judge to take some affirmative step, counsel must clearly 
indicate the action that he or she desires the judge to take. I d. at § 1777. If counsel wishes 
to indicate disapproval of the judge's action, objection must be made. ld. at§ 1777. Counsel 
may specify the grounds for objection but cannot argue or discuss the grounds unless the 
judge requests such argument or discussion. Id. at § 1778. 
3 Id. at § 1775. Judicial economy is served when the error is brought to the judge's 
attention. See State v. Applegate, 39 Or. App. 17, 21, 591 P.2d 371, 373 (1979). The public 
should not be put to the expense of a retrial that could have been avoided had proper 
objection been made. ld. 
17
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counsel from gaining unfair tactical advantage. 4 Courts have noted the 
possibility that a party knowing of a secret defect could proceed and take 
its chance for a favorable verdict, all the while possessing "the power 
and intent to annul it as erroneous and void" if the verdict should be 
adverse. 5 Similarly, the availability of review in spite of the lack of 
objection would free a party to make tactical trial decisions which, if 
they should backfire, could be deemed error warranting reversal of a 
conviction.6 
Under Massachusetts law, however, the reviewing court may consider 
an issue which was not preserved by proper objection, in order to prevent 
a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.7 A reviewing court which 
finds that a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice exists may reverse 
the defendant's conviction,8 or may remand the case for a new trial. 9 
Permitting appellate review of errors not objected to at trial protects 
defendants from unjust conviction attributable to defense counsel's mis-
take or inadvertence. 10 
4 See infra notes 5-6 and accompanying text. 
5 Commonwealth v. Cancel, 394 Mass. 567, 571-72, 476 N.E.2d 610, 614 (1985) (citing 
Cady v. Norton, 14 Pick. 236, 237 (1833)). 
6 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Askins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 927, 929, 465 N.E.2d 1224, 
1227 (l984)(in responding to defendant's argument that judge erred in failing to instruct 
jury that lack of consent was an element of the crime of indecent assault and battery of a 
person under the age of fourteen, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reasoned that "[a]s a 
matter of trial tactics, however, it is apparent that there was little point in doing so .... 
Indeed, pressing the point would doubtless have been counterproductive to the defendant's 
position that the acts alleged never occurred at all."), further appellate review denied, 469 
N.E.2d 830 (1984). See also Commonwealth v. Cartagena, 386 Mass. 285, 288-89, 435 
N.E.2d 352, 354-55 (1982) (in responding to defendant's argument that the trial judge erred 
in failing to consider voluntariness of defendant's confession on his own motion, the 
Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that, in addition to the absence of any evidence of 
involuntariness which would have triggered a voir dire, the trial tactic of not challenging 
admissibility of defendant's statement appeared to have been a reasonable one at time it 
was chosen). 
7 Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 690, 448 N.E.2d 704, 711 (1983); Common-
wealth v. Wood, 380 Mass. 545, 547, 404 N.E.2d 1223, 1225 (1980); Commonwealth v. 
Freeman, 352 Mass. 556, 563-64, 227 N.E.2d 3, 9 (1967). G.L. c. 218, § 33E expressly 
grants the Supreme Judicial Court authority to review issues not objected to In capital 
cases. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Tavares, 385 Mass .. 140, 147-48, 430 N.E.2d 1198, 1209 
(1982); Commonwealth v. Cole, 380 Mass. 30, 38-39, 402 N.E.2d 55, 60-61 (1980). 
8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 699, 448 N.E.2d at 715; Common-
wealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. at 564, 227 N.E.2d at 9. 
9 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cancel, 394 Mass. 567, 576, 476 N.E.2d 610, 617 (1985); 
Commonwealth v. Wood, 380 Mass. at 551, 404 N.E.2d at 1228. 
10 In cases reversing convictions under the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice 
standard, the prejudice to defendant probably would have been avoided had counsel 
properly objected at trial. See generally, Commonwealth v. Pickles, 393 Mass. 775, 778-
80, 473 N.E.2d 694, 697 (1985) (prejudicial jury charge misled jury as to who had burden 
18
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Applying the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice standard of re-
view, Massachusetts courts have found reversible error in a variety of 
contexts.'' In determining whether an error not objected to below created 
a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice to the defendant, these courts 
have considered the following factors: 12 the relationship between the 
alleged error and the premise of defense, 13 which party introduced the 
allegedly erroneous issue at trial, 14 the quantum of evidence of guilt 
already present against the defendant, 15 the frequency of the allegedly 
of proof); Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583, 594, 447 N.E.2d 1217, 1223 (1983) 
(prosecutor made three inflammatory, irrelevant, and non-evidentiary lines of argument 
prejudicing defendant; absence of proper objection by defendant). In these cases, the 
prejudice created the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice to defendant. See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Pickles, 393 Mass. at 780, 473 N.E.2d at 697; Commonwealth v. Clary, 
388 Mass. at 594, 447 N .E.2d at 1223. Thus it follows that the substantial risk of miscarriage 
of justice was attributable to defense counsel's mistake or inadvertence. 
11 Reviewing courts have found a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice where there 
were improper jury instructions or charges. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pickles, 393 Mass. 
at 779-80, 473 N.E.2d at 697 Gury instruction which could have been interpreted to mean 
that defendant had burden of proving his innocence and was confusing as to what elements 
of crime defendant had stipulated created substantial risk of miscarriage of justice); Com-
monwealth v. Wood, 380 Mass. 545, 549,404 N.E.2d at 1223, 1227. But see Commonwealth 
v. Howell, 386 Mass. 738, 740, 437 N.E.2d 1067, 1069 (1982) (instruction that there was 
evidence that defendant assaulted victim with intent to rape her did not impermissibly 
invade province of jury, was "but a slip of the tongue," was adequately cured by balance 
of instructions, and therefore did not create substantial risk of miscarriage of justice). A 
substantial risk of miscarriage of justice has also been found where the prosecution made 
improper arguments or references. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 
692-99, 448 N.E.2d 704, 713-15 (1983) (prosecutor's questions on cross-examination of 
defendant referring to religious tenets which were without probative value and tended only 
to inject racial hatred into trial coupled with prosecutor's comment on defendant's exercise 
of Miranda rights created substantial risk of miscarriage of justice). But see Commonwealth 
v. Askins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 928, 465 N.E.2d at 1226 (1984) (prosecutor's reference to 
foreign accent of doctor who testified for defendant did not constitute appeal to racial or 
religious bigotry amounting to prejudicial error). 
12 The list of factors appears in Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 696-97, 448 
N.E.2d at 714-15. 
13 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. at 592-93, 447 N.E.2d at 1222-23 (in 
finding substantial risk of miscarriage of justice, Court noted that prosecutor's argument 
was not confined to collateral issues; rather, the overreaching argument struck impermis-
sibly at defendant's sole defense by suggesting that defendant's alleged stabbing of victim 
was motivated by desire to defend her lover); Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 695, 
697-98, 448 N.E.2d at 713, 715 (in finding substantial risk of miscarriage of justice, Court 
considered that the prosecutor's argument concerning defendant's post-arrest silence struck 
at "the jugular" of defendant's insanity defense by suggesting defendant was sane enough 
to recognize importance of remaining silent). 
14 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 696-98, 448 N.E.2d at 714-15 (in 
finding a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice, Court noted that the improper evidence 
was introduced and pursued by the district attorney). 
15 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. at 593-94, 447 N.E.2d at 1223 (in finding 
19
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improper reference, 16 and the availability or effect of curative instruc-
tions.17 In virtually all of the cases in which the reviewing court found 
reversible error using the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice stan-
dard, the court considered the error or errors individually, and found the 
error or errors themselves to be sufficiently prejudicial to require rever-
saLts 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Cancel, 19 the Massachu-
setts Supreme Judicial Court reversed a criminal conviction and re-
manded the case for a new trial, holding that while none of the errors at 
trial considered individually were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant re-
versal of defendant's conviction, they combined to create a substantial 
risk of miscarriage of justice. 20 The Court applied the substantial risk of 
miscarriage of justice standard of review because one of the errors had 
not been preserved properly by objection below under Rule 22.21 Cancel 
demonstrates an unusual application of review under the substantial risk 
of miscarriage of justice standard because the cumulative effect of error, 
not an individual error, was the cause for reversal. 22 The Court did not 
express what quantum of prejudice was necessary to meet the standard 
of a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice. 23 By implication, the Su-
preme Judicial Court has left this issue to case-by-case determination.24 
that three errors combined to create a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice, Court noted 
that other proof against defendant was "far from overwhelming"). 
16 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 698, 448 N.E.2d at 715 (Court noted 
that district attorney made not one, but two separate improper references to defendant's 
exercise of his Miranda rights). 
17 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. at 591,447 N.E.2d at 1221-22 (in finding 
substantial risk of miscarriage of justice, Court reasoned that generally termed instruction 
that statements of counsel are not evidence did not adequately cure the prejudicial impact 
of prosecutor's argument); Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 698,448 N.E.2d at 715 
(Court considered lack of curative instructions). 
18 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Pickles, 393 Mass. at 780, 473 N.E.2d at 697 (instruction 
was prejudicial error resulting in a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth 
v. Wood, 300 Mass. at 549, 404 N.E.2d at 1227 (jury charge was prejudicial error resulting 
in a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Freeman, 352 Mass. at 
563-64, 227 N.E.2d at 9 (jury charge was prejudicial error resulting in substantial risk of 
miscarriage of justice). But see Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. at 594, 447 N.E.2d at 
1223 (Court considered "combined effect" of three improper arguments by prosecutor in 
finding substantial risk of miscarriage of justice); Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. at 
698-99, 448 N.E.2d at 715 (Court concluded that prosecutor's exploitation of defendant's 
exercise of his Miranda rights "coupled with" improper questions and argument on religion 
created a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice). 
19 394 Mass. 567, 476 N.E.2d 610 (1985). 
20 /d. at 576, 476 N.E.2d at 617 (emphasis added). 
21 See id. at 570, 476 N.E.2d at 614. See also infra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. 
22 See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
23 See Cancel, 394 Mass. at 576, 476 N.E.2d at 617. 
24 See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
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Thus, it is within the Court's discretion to determine when individual 
errors, each insufficiently prejudicial to require reversal, add up to create 
a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice. 25 
The defendant in Commonwealth v. Cancel was convicted of arson. 26 
In May, 1982, a fire broke out in a closet of the defendant's apartment. 27 
In the trial court, two witnesses testified that they saw the defendant set 
the fire. 28 Both witnesses admitted to bias and their testimony differed 
on several details. 29 In addition, a member of the fire department's arson 
squad testified that he believed the fire had been set. 30 
The owner of the building testified that while he was on a back porch 
of the building shortly after the fire, he saw the defendant standing on a 
street corner approximately 150 feet from the building. 31 The owner also 
testified that the defendant later told him that he was out of town on the 
day of the fire. 32 Because the building owner's testimony included hearsay 
which the judge improperly allowed into evidence, the Appeals Court 
summarily reversed the conviction.33 The Supreme Judicial Court granted 
the Commonwealth's application for further review. 34 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Appeal Court's reversal of 
the defendant's conviction and remanded the case to the trial court for 
a new trial. 35 The Court held that several rulings which were made by 
the trial court were erroneous and, when considered in the aggregate, 
had created a substantial risk of undue prejudice to the defendant at 
trial. 36 In reaching this conclusion, the Court considered three rulings 
made by the trial courtY First, the Court considered the trial court's 
admission over the defendant's general objection, of hearsay testimony 
to establish the content of an out of court statement. 38 Second, the Court 
considered the trial court's admission over the defendant's objection, of 
collateral evidence for purposes of impeachment. 39 Third, the Court con-
sidered the trial court's failure to instruct the jury regarding the impro-
25 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. 
26 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 567, 476 N.E.2d at 610. 
27 Id. at 567, 476 N.E.2d at 612. 
28 Id. at 568, 476 N.E.2d at 613. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 569, 476 N.E.2d at 613. 
31 ld. at 568-69, 476 N.E.2d at 613. 
32 Id. at 569, 476 N.E.2d at 613. 
33 Id. at 567-68, 476 N.E.2d at 612 (citing Commonwealth v. Cancel, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 
1114, 469 N .E.2d 831 (1984)). 
34 Commonwealth v. Cancel, 394 Mass. at 568, 476 N.E.2d at 612. 
35 Id. at 576, 476 N.E.2d at 617. 
36 I d. See also infra notes 55-78 and accompanying text. 
37 See infra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. 
38 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 569-71, 476 N.E.2d at 613-14. 
39 Id. at 572-73, 476 N.E.2d at 614-15. 
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priety of the prosecutor's comments implying the absence of alibi wit-
nesses after defendant's objection.40 In considering these three rulings, 
the Supreme Judicial Court addressed whether the issues raised had been 
preserved for review by proper objection by the defendant, and, if so, 
whether the trial court's rulings were correct.41 
In considering the admissibility of the hearsay statements, the Court 
first reviewed the testimony of a witness of the Commonwealth regarding 
an out of court conversation he had with the defendant. 42 In addition, 
the Court noted that defense counsel had objected only generally to this 
testimony and had not renewed the objection or moved to strike after it 
was overruled.43 The Court held that the building owner's statement was 
inadmissible hearsay relevant only for its truth. 44 In addition, the Court 
found that the defendant had failed to preserve the issue for review by 
proper objection under Rule 22. 45 With respect to the admissibility of the 
hearsay, the Court reasoned that where a witness reports that he or she 
made an accusation and the accused responded, both the reported ac-
cusation and reported response are admissible if the accused responds in 
an "equivocal, evasive, or irresponsive way inconsistent with his inno-
cence. "46 If, however, the accused unequivocally denies the accusation, 
neither the accusation not the response are admissible into evidenceY 
40 /d. at 573-76, 476 N.E.2d at 615-17. 
41 See infra notes 43-75 and accompanying text. 
42 Before the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant argued that the statement, "a lot of 
people told me you're responsible for it" was inadmissible hearsay. 394 Mass. at 569, 476 
N.E.2d at 613. The building owner testified at trial that a day or two after the fire, he saw 
the defendant and a conversation commenced. /d. at 569, 476 N.E.2d at 613. The building 
owner testified that the conversation consisted in part of the defendant volunteering that 
he had nothing to do with the fire, to which the building owner responded, "a lot of people 
told me that you're responsible for it." /d. At this point in the building owner's testimony, 
defense counsel injected with one word, "objection". /d. at 570 n.2, 476 N.E.2d at 613 n.2. 
The trial judge ruled the statement admissible for showing what the conversation was, not· 
for the truth of the statement. /d. at 569, 476 N.E.2d at 613. The building owner proceeded 
to testify that in response to this accusation, defendant had said that he was out of town 
and had just returned. /d. at 570 n.2, 476 N.E.2d at 613 n.2. Defense counsel did not object 
or move to strike this testimony. /d. at 569, 476 N.E.2d at 613. 
The Commonwealth contended that the statement was admissible because it was nec-
essary to place other "consciousness of guilt" evidence into context. /d. The Court found 
that the hearsay statement was not necessary for that purpose, concluding that the statement 
was relevant only for its truth. /d. at 569-70, 476 N.E.2d at 613-14. 
43 /d. at 570, 476 N.E.2d at 614. The Commonwealth argued that the objection was 
insufficient under Rule 22 to preserve the right to dispute the judge's ruling on admissibility 
of the hearsay testimony. /d. at 569, 476 N.E.2d at 613. 
44 /d. at 570, 476 N.E.2d at 613-14. 
45 /d. at 570, 476 N.E.2d at 614. 
46 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 571, 476 N.E.2d at 614 (quoting Commonwealth v. Machado, 339 
Mass. 713, 715-16, 162 N.E.2d 71, 73 (1959)). 
47 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 570-71, 476 N.E.2d at 614 (citing Commonwealth v. Pleasant, 
22
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1985 [1985], Art. 9
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1985/iss1/9
§ 5.3 EVIDENCE 203 
Thus, the Court found that the defendant's out of court denial of the 
witnesses' accusation was not admissible under the hearsay exception 
for admission against interest. 48 
With respect to the propriety of defense counsel's objections, the Court 
reasoned that the defendant's general objection was untimely under Rule 
22 because when the objection was made, it was not yet clear whether 
the statement would be relevant other than for its truth. 49 The Court 
noted that in the instant case, defense counsel's objection had been 
interposed before the witness testified as to the defendant's response to 
the accusation. 50 The Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that, as the trial 
judge could not then know what the nature of defendant's alleged re-
sponse would be, the judge could not at that time rule upon admissibil-
ity ,51 In addition, the Court maintained that once it became clear that the 
defendant's response to the accusation was an unequivocal denial, the 
defendant should have either renewed his objection or moved to strike 
the testimony. 52 The Court held that defendant's failure to act at this 
juncture destroyed his right to appellate review of this error. 53 While the 
Court found the hearsay testimony prejudicial to the defendant, the Court 
maintained that it was not sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal of 
the conviction. 54 
In considering the trial court's admission of collateral evidence for 
impeachment purposes, the Court first reviewed the line of questioning 
in which the prosecutor attempted to impeach a defense witness by 
eliciting information regarding his membership in a street gang. 55 The 
366 Mass. 100, 102, 315 N.E.2d 874, 876 (1974); Commonwealth v. Twombly, 319 Mass. 
464, 465, 66 N.E.2d 362, 363 (1946)). 
48 See Cancel, 394 Mass. at 570, 476 N.E.2d at 613-14. 
49 Id. at 570, 476 N.E.2d at 614. 




54 Id. at 576, 476 N.E.2d at 617. The Court noted that it was not apparent that the 
defendant was dissatisfied with the judge's ruling. /d. at 571, 476 N .E.2d at 614. The Court 
further stated that the judge's ruling was not unequivocably adverse. Id. (This is presumably 
because the defendant's response to the accusation was consistent with innocence.) See 
id. at 569 n.2, 476 N.E.2d at 613 n.2. 
55 Id. at 572, 476 N.E.2d at 614-15. The witness testified that an unknown woman 
approached him in the courthouse, offered to "stop the case" against the defendant for 300 
dollars, and then walked away laughing. Id. at 572, 476 N.E.2d at 614. In attempting to 
impeach the witness' testimony, the Commonwealth introduced several prior convictions 
of the witness into evidence. /d. The Commonwealth then questioned the defendant about 
a street gang in Springfield and succeeded in eliciting that the witness used to be a gang 
member. Id. at 572 n.5, 476 N.E.2d at 615 n.5. Before the Supreme Judicial Court, the 
defendant argued that it was improper for the judge to allow impeachment of the witness 
by reference to his membership in a street gang. ld. at 568, 476 N.E.2d at 612. 
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Court also noted that the defendant objected generally to the line of 
questioning seeking to elicit this information and that the trial judge 
overruled this objection.56 The Court found that the testimony was im-
properly admitted57 and that defendant's objection was sufficient under 
Rule 22 to preserve the ruling for review. 58 Yet, the Court maintained 
that the improper admission of the testimony was not prejudicial enough 
to warrant reversal. 59 
In addressing the propriety of the line of questioning, the Court first 
cited the settled rule regarding the introduction of evidence used to 
impeach a witness, that the inquiry is limited to the witness' reputation 
for truth and veracity.60 The Court reasoned that the witness' past mem-
bership in a street gang was clearly a collateral issue irrelevant to his 
veracity, and could only tend to appeal to the juries prejudice against 
street gangs. 61 Thus, the Court reasoned, the impeachment evidence 
should not have been admitted.62 
Turning to the sufficiency of defense counsel's objection, the Court 
found the objection proper because it was timely and because there was 
no need to specify the ground where the ground should have been obvious 
to the judge.63 Although the Court held that the trial judge erred in 
admitting this impeachment evidence, the Court maintained that this error 
alone was not sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to require rever-
sal. 64 The Court found no prejudice because the witness' credibility had 
already been impeached with several prior convictions and the evidence 
the witness provided was not particularly relevant to the defendant's 
guilt. 65 
Considering the trial court's failure to give instructions regarding the 
prosecutor's comments on the absence of alibi witnesses, the Court first 
56 Id. at 573, 476 N.E.2d at 615. See also id. at 572 n.5, 476 N.E.2d at 614-15 n.5. The 
Commonwealth argued that the objection was insufficient under Rule 22 to preserve the 
right to appellate review of this error. ld. at 573, 476 N.E.2d at 615. The Commonwealth 
also argued that even if an error was made, it was harmless. Id. See also infra notes 60-
62 and accompanying text. 
57 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 573, 476 N.E.2d at 615. See also infra notes 60-62 and accom-
panying text. 
58 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 573, 476 N.E.2d at 615. 
59 ld. 
60 ld. at 572, 476 N.E.2d at 615 (citing Eastman v. Boston Elevated Ry., 200 Mass. 412, 
413, 86 N.E. 793, 793 (1909); F.W. Stock & Sons v. Dellapenna, 217 Mass. 503, 506, 105 
N.E. 378, 379 (1914); P.J. LIACOS, MASSACHUSETTS EVIDENCE 146-47 (5th ed. 1981)). 
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reviewed the prosecutor's remarks to determine their propriety.66 The 
Court reasoned that the jury could have construed the prosecutor's clos-
ing remarks as a comment on the defendant's failure to call any alibi 
witnesses. 67 The Court explained that comment on the defendant's failure 
to call any alibi witnesses is permissible only if there is some evidence 
that witnesses other than the defendant were available for that purpose.68 
The Court found that as there was no indication that the defendant had 
any alibi witnesses available, the prosecutor's comment on the defen-
dant's failure to call alibi witnesses was improper. 69 
Furthermore, the Court noted that defense counsel had objected gen-
erally to the remarks in a bench conference following the trial and had 
not requested curative instructions.70 However, the Court reasoned that 
although defense counsel's objection fell short of the desired clarity in 
expressing a problem and suggesting a remedy/' the objection was suf-
ficient to preserve the issue for review because it was timely and suffi-
ciently apprised the judge of the grounds on which it was based.72 Al-
though the Court held that the defendant's objection was sufficient to 
preserve the issue for review, albeit minimally/3 and that the prosecutor 
committed error in the closing argument by commenting on the defen-
66 /d. at 573-76, 476 N.E.2d at 615-17. As part of his closing argument, the prosecutor 
essentially suggested that people do not tend to make intentionally false accusations of 
crime against specific individuals because it is likely that the accused persons are "out 
there somewhere with some people doing things" at the time of the crime. See id. at 573 
n.6, 476 N.E.2d at 615 n.6. Before the Supreme Judicial Court, the defendant did his best 
to argue that because the defendant had a constitutional right not to testify and the choice 
not to call alibi witnesses, prosecutor's argument implying that if defendant had an alibi he 
would have testified or called alibi witnesses, was improper. /d. at 574 n.7, 476 N.E.2d at 
616 n.7. See also id. at 573, 476 N.E.2d at 615. The Commonwealth argued that the 
prosecutor's remarks merely responded to the defense counsel's suggestions that several 
witnesses were lying. /d. See also infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
67 394 Mass. at 575, 476 N.E.2d at 616. In reviewing the prosecutor's closing arguments, 
the Supreme Judicial Court found no remarks which could reasonably be construed as 
referring to the defendant's decision not to testify. /d. The Court reasoned that even if the 
jury were to have construed the prosecutor's remarks as referring to the defendant's 
decision not to testify, any resulting prejudice towards the defendant was dissipated by the 
judge's strong instruction on the defendant's right not to testify. /d. The judge's instruction 
is set forth id. at 575 n.S, 476 N.E.2d at 616 n.S. 
68 /d. at 575, 476 N.E.2d at 616, and cases cited therein. 
69 394 Mass. at 576, 476 N.E.2d at 617. 
70 /d. at 574 n.7, 476 N.E.2d at 616 n.7. The Commonwealth argued that the defendant 
did not preserve this issue for review under Rule 22 because the objection occurring at the 
end of the prosecutor's argument was untimely, and furthermore, neither a mistrial nor 
curative instruction was sought. /d. at 573-74, 476 N.E.2d at 616. See infra notes 71-73 
and accompanying text. 
71 /d. at 574, 476 N.E.2d at 616. 
72 /d. 
73 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text. 
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dant's failure to call alibi witnesses,74 the Court maintained that this error 
alone was not sufficiently prejudicial to the defendant to require rever-
sal.75 
In spite of the Court's finding that none of the three errors considered 
individually was sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal of the defen-
dant's conviction,76 the Court had "serious doubt" as to whether the 
defendant was unduly prejudiced by the combination of these errors.77 
Considering all three errors in combination, the Court reasoned that the 
errors resulted in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.78 Conse-
quently, the Court reversed the judgment, set aside the jury verdict and 
remanded the case for a new trial. 79 
In sum, the Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Cancel re-
versed the trial court's conviction under the substantial risk of miscar-
riage of justice standard of review in an unusual application of this 
standard.80 The Court found that the cumulative effect of several errors, 
each of which was not prejudicial, in combination created the substantial 
risk of miscarriage of justice.81 While the Court reversed on the basis of 
74 See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
75 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 576, 476 N.E.2d at 617. In holding that the error was not in itself 
sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal, the Court considered the context of the improper 
comments, the inadequate defense response, and the judge's instructions to the jury. /d. 
The second consideration, that of the inadequate defense response, seems irrelevant to 
whether the error was prejudicial. Instead, the response seems more relevant to defendant's 
right to review of this error. See MAss. R. CRIM. P. 22, supra note l. 
76 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 576, 467 N.E.2d at 617. 
77 ld. See also Commonwealth v. Wood, 380 Mass. at 550, 404 N.E.2d at 1227 (in 
reversing conviction because of a substantial risk of miscarriage of justice, Court maintained 
that "serious doubt" existed as to whether judge's instructions prejudiced defendant and 
reasoned that such doubt must be resolved in defendant's favor). 
78 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 576, 467 N.E.2d at 617. In finding a substantial risk of miscarriage 
of justice, the Court did not expressly consider factors such as the relationship between 
the errors and premise of defense, which party introduced the erroneous issue at trial, the 
weight or quantum of evidence of guilt already present against the defendant, or the 
frequency of the erroneous reference. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text. The 
Court did expressly consider the effect of jury instructions on the alleged error of the 
prosecutor's comments on the defendant's decision not to testify. Cancel, 394 Mass. at 
575,476 N.E.2d at 616. This consideration went to whether there was error at all, however, 
and not to the prejudicial effect of the alleged error. See id. Thus, in finding a substantial 
risk of miscarriage of justice due to the prejudicial effect of the combination of these errors, 
the Court did not explain what factors they considered in finding prejudice to the defendant, 
or how the errors added up to create the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice to the 
defendant. 
79 Id. at 576; 476 N.E.2d at 617. 
80 See infra note 81 and supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
81 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 576, 476 N.E.2d at 617. 
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the combination of errors, it recognized that no one error was sufficiently 
prejudicial to warrant reversal. 82 
The Cancel opinion expressed no measurement or quantum to deter-
mine when errors, not sufficiently prejudicial themselves, combine to 
create sufficient prejudice to warrant reversal.83 Thus, while extending 
the application of the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice standard 
to a new situation,84 the Court gave no guidance as to how this extension 
would be applied in the future. 85 Instead, the propriety of reversal under 
the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice standard of review involves 
a case-by-case determination entirely within the Court's discretion.86 
The Court's case-by-case application of this standard of review strikes 
a practical balance between protecting defendants from unjust prosecu-
tion due to counsel's mistake87 and enforcing the requirement that counsel 
comply with Rule 22 to preserve the right of appellate review. 88 That the 
Court has not articulated how or when individual errors not sufficiently 
prejudicial themselves to require reversal, combine to create a substantial 
risk of miscarriage of justice,89 enforces the requirement of Rule 22 that 
proper objection be made below. 90 As the application of the substantial 
risk of miscarriage of justice standard of review remains discretionary 
with the Court, counsel would be imprudent to rely on the availability of 
this review when they discover that there was an error unobjected to at 
trial, or that a tactical decision not to object backfired.91 The case-by-
case application of the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice standard 
of review does not ensure the losing defendant a second chance.92 Rather, 
82 /d. While not finding the hearsay error prejudicial enough to warrant reversal, the 
Court did find the hearsay testimony prejudicial- the only error expressly defined as such. 
/d. 
83 See id. See supra note 78 and accompanying text. Arguably, the Court is applying a 
"serious doubt" standard. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. Whether "serious 
doubt" exists is still a discretionary decision resting with the court. See note 77. 
84 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
85 See supra notes 7, 83 and accompanying text. In contrast, by stating the factors that 
were considered, the opinions in Commonwealth v. Clary, 388 Mass. 583,477 N.E.2d 1217, 
and Commonwealth v. Mahdi, 388 Mass. 679, 448 N.E.2d 704, offer some guidance as to 
when the cumulative effect of individual errors creates a substantial risk of miscarriage of 
justice. See supra notes 12-17 and accompanying text. 
86 See supra note 7 and cases cited therein. See also supra notes 83-85, and accompanying 
text. 
87 See infra notes 94-98 and accompanying text. 
88 See infra notes 89-93 and accompanying text. 
89 See supra note 85. 
90 See infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text. 
91 See supra note 6 and cases cited therein. See also infra notes 92-93. 
92 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Askins, 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 927-30,465 N.E.2d at 1225-
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the trial record is strictly scrutinized, warranting reversal or new trial 
only where the error or errors were egregious enough to convince the 
reviewing court that the risk of a miscarriage of justice was substantial.93 
Thus, counsel should comply with the requirements of Rule 22 to pre-
serve the right to review of error. For the practitioner, an assured right 
of review is preferable to a discretionary decision to review by the 
reviewing court. As Cancel demonstrates, however, where it is clear that 
the trial as a whole was not conducted properly and unduly prejudiced 
the defendant, failure to preserve the right to review by proper objection 
below will not operate as a complete bar to appellate review.94 
Permitting a court to review alleged errors on appeal notwithstanding 
counsel's lack of proper objection is sometimes necessary to avoid a 
miscarriage of justice. 95 Cancel exemplifies such a situation. 96 The defen-
dant was prejudiced to the degree that the trial created a substantial risk 
of injustice.97 Instead of remaining powerless to correct the probable 
injustice suffered by defendant, the Court was able to order a new trial 
under the substantial risk of miscarriage of justice standard of review.98 
The Cancel cumulative approach affords the defendant prejudiced solely 
by the combination of errors the same protection from unjust prosecution 
27 (none of six alleged errors created substantial risk of miscarriage of justice; conviction 
affirmed); Commonwealth v. Howell, 386 Mass. at 738-40, 437 N.E.2d at 1068-69 (alleged 
erroneous jury instruction did not create substantial risk of miscarriage of justice; conviction 
affirmed). 
93 See supra note 7 (emphasis added). 
94 See Cancel, 394 Mass. at 576, 476 N.E.2d at 617. 
9
' See supra note 7 and accompanying text. In applying the substantial risk of miscarriage 
of justice standard of review, courts manifest their concern with the realities of trial practice: 
trials are fast-paced, often calling for split-second judgment of counsel. Error may occur 
which escapes both defense counsel and the judge. Accordingly, courts will allow an 
exception to the requirement of proper timely objection to preserve an issue for review. 
W.R. LAFAVE & J.H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 26.5 (abridged 1985). See MASS. 
R. CRIM. P. 22 (if a party has no opportunities to object to a ruling or order, the absence 
of an objection does not thereafter prejudice the party). The refusal to consider a claim 
where the procedural rule arbitrarily imposes an impossible time limit on the defense may 
in itself constitute a violation of due process. See, e.g., Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S. 85, 
89-90 (1975). 
A defendant should not be unjustly prosecuted due to counsel's mistake or inadvertence. 
See generally Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96, 315 N.E.2d 878, 883 (1974) 
(test is whether behavior of counsel falls measurably below that which might be expected 
from an ordinarily fallible lawyer, thereby depriving defendant of an otherwise substantial 
ground of defense); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687, 6% (6th Cir. 1974) (if counsel's 
inadequacy deprives defendant of a fair trial, conviction may be reversed). 
96 See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text. 
97 Cancel, 394 Mass. at 576, 476 N.E.2d at 617. 
98 /d. 
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which courts have afforded defendants prejudiced from single reversible 
error.99 
The case-by-case application of the substantial risk of miscarriage of 
justice standard of review affords the Court useful flexibility in determin-
ing whether a defendant was unduly prejudiced by the combination of 
errors. Courts could not possibly fashion a concise measurement whereby 
they could determine when individual errors, not sufficiently prejudicial 
themselves to require reversal, add up to create a substantial risk of 
miscarriage of justice. Determining whether a particular defendant was 
prejudiced necessarily involves a case-by-case analysis of the individual 
errors involved. Thus, case-by-case application of this standard of review 
serves not only to enforce the requirement of proper objection under 
Rule 22, but also permits the Court to protect defendants from unjust 
prosecution. 
§ 5.4. Expert Testimony in Rape Cases - Extrajudicial Identification.* 
Under Massachusetts law, a witness may not be asked directly whether 
a rape or sexual assault has occurred. 1 Because such testimony would 
substantially prejudice the jury's decision on an ultimate issue of fact, 
Massachusetts courts have ruled the testimony to be inadmissible.2 In 
the 1966 decision, Commonwealth v. Gardner,3 the Supreme Judicial 
Court first ruled on the admissibility of an expert's testimony that a rape 
had occurred.4 Based on the expert's examination of the alleged victim's 
person and clothing, his observance of her emotional state, and her 
account of "what happened," the trial court permitted a gynecologist to 
testify that a rape had taken place.5 Because medical testimony that acts 
of intercourse had been accomplished by a "forcible entry" was tanta-
mount to testimony that the victim was raped, the Supreme Judicial Court 
99 Id. (Emphasis added). Compare Cancel, id. (cumulative errors created substantial risk 
of miscarriage of justice; conviction reversed) with Commonwealth v. Pickles, 393 Mass. 
at 780, 473 N .E.2d at 697 (single erroneous instruction created substantial risk of miscarriage 
of justice; conviction reversed); Commonwealth v. Wood, 380 Mass. at 549-50,404 N.E.2d 
at 1227 (single erroneous jury charge created substantial risk of miscarriage of justice; 
conviction reversed). 
*Timothy M. Smith, staff member, ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW. 
§ 5.4. 1 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Montmeny, 360 Mass. 526, 528, 276 N.E.2d 688, 
690 (1971); Commonwealth v. Gardner, 350 Mass. 664, 666-67, 216 N.E.2d 558, 560-61 
(1966). 
2 Gardner, 350 Mass. at 667, 216 N.E.2d at 560-61. 
J 350 Mass. 664, 216 N.E.2d 558 (1966). 
4 I d. at 665-67, 216 N.E.2d at 559-61. 
5 Id. at 665-66, 216 N.E.2d at 559-60. 
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ruled that the medical testimony should have been excluded.6 The Court 
found, moreover, that the expert witness's opinion, presented as the 
unbiased testimony of an expert, could have improperly and substantially 
influenced the jury's decision as to whom to believe, and thus should 
have been excluded.7 
In addition to the issue of the admissibility of an expert's testimony 
that a rape has occurred, the Massachusetts courts have dealt with the 
admissibility of extrajudicial identifications.8 In the 1984 decision, Com-
monwealth v. Daye,9 the Supreme Judicial Court held that an extrajudicial 
identification cannot be used substantively unless the identifying witness 
acknowledges that the identification was, in fact, made. 10 In Daye, tes-
timony by a police offi<:er that a witness had identified a photograph of 
the defendant from a pre-trial photographic array was held to be invalid 
because the witness denied making the identification. 11 
During the Survey year, in Commonwealth v. Mendrala, 12 the Massa-
chusetts Appeals Court reaffirmed the well-established principle that an 
expert witness may not be asked directly whether a victim has suffered 
from a rape or other sexual assault. 13 In addition, the M endrala court 
ruled that the complainant's hysterical identification of the defendants 
was admissible as a spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule, 
even though the complainant did not acknowledge this extrajudicial iden-
tification at trial. 14 Although the complainant failed to acknowledge that 
6 /d. at 666, 216 N.E.2d at 560. 
7 /d. at 667, 216 N.E.2d at 561. The court rioted, "We are not persuaded that a gynecol-
ogist, or other expert, possesses skills or special experience which might enable him to 
determine ... that acts of intercourse amounted to rape." /d., 216 N.E.2d at 560. 
8 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Daye, 393 Mass. 55, 469 N.E.2d 483 (1984). An extraju-
dicial identification is one in which the identification has occurred outside of the trial 
proceeding. /d. at 57, 469 N.E.2d at 487-88. 
9 /d. 
10 /d. at 61, 469 N.E.2d at 488. 
11 /d. at 61-62, 469 N.E.2d at 488. 
12 20 Mass. App. Ct. 398, 480 N.E.2d 1039 (1985). 
13 /d. at 404, 480 N.E.2d at 1042. In Commonwealth v. Montmeny, 360 Mass. 526, 528, 
276 N.E.2d 688, 690 the Supreme Judicial Court reasserted Gardner's reasoning by stating 
that a direct opinion by an expert witness that a rape occurred is beyond the witness's 
province as !In expert witness.ld. The Court found that where the jury is equally competent 
in drawing the conclusion sought from the expert witness, the expert's testimony is inad-
missible. /d. at 528, 276 N.E.id at 689. 
14 Mendrala, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 401, 480 N.E.2d at 1041. Although the court did not 
explicitly state that an acknowledgment was not made, it can be inferred from the opinion 
that this was the case. The complainant testified that one of her assailants had been one of 
the front seat passengers, that Mendrala was the driver, and that she could not identify 
Bailey. /d. at 400, 480 N.E.2d at 1040. However, the court states, "although at the time 
the Commonwealth rested its case, there was evidence that he [Bailey] was one of three 
men in the car with the complainant, there was no evidence, other than the hearsay 
30
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the identification was made, the Mendrala court held that Daye 15 does 
not prevent the admissibility of her identification through the use of 
another exception to the hearsay rule, such as a spontaneous utterance. 16 
In Mendrala, the complainant, a twenty-one year old woman, was 
picked up by three men in a car. 17 She was, by her own account, 
"drunk. " 18 In the vehicle, she joined the men in drinking more alcohol, 
and smoking marijuana. 19 The driver of the automobile refused to take 
the route she requested, and when she asked the men to tum the car 
around, they started laughing. 20 After repeated requests, she was allowed 
to relieve herself in an isolated area outside of the car. 21 When she ran 
to some bushes, two of the men followed her, prevented her from pulling 
her pants up, and took turns touching her vagina with their fingers. 22 
Thereafter, the two men dragged her back toward the car at which time 
the headlights of another vehicle became visible. 23 This other vehicle was 
a police car. 24 One of the officers in the car that night testified that he 
noticed a young woman with her pants down near the rear of the first 
car. 25 She tried to escape but was apprehended and placed in the back 
of the police car. 26 The officer also noticed a person wearing a white hat 
enter the car through the driver's door.27 The car, which appeared to 
have two people28 in the front seat, backed away, turned around, and 
was followed by the police car at a rapid rate of speed. 29 After a short 
car pursuit, the two men were stopped by the police. 30 At the direction 
testimony of the officers, that he was one of the two men who allegedly assaulted her." /d. 
at 400, 480 N.E.2d at 1040. Furthermore, the court stated, "although the identification 
could not qualify under the exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Daye ... ," acknowl-
edgment of identification is required for the Daye exception to apply./d. at 401,480 N.E.2d 
at 1041. Accordingly, it appears that the complainant never made an acknowledgment of 
her extrajudicial identification. 
15 393 Mass. 55, 469 N.E.2d 483 (1984). 
16 Mendra/a, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 401, 480 N.E.2d at 1041. 
'










27 /d. at 400, 480 N.E.2d at 1040. 
28 /d. It is difficult to ascertain from the facts what happened to the third man. It appears 
that he alighted from the car when the complainant was relieving herself, and escaped when 
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of the police officers, the two occupants emerged from their vehicle, 
were handcuffed, and placed on the ground in the beam of the police 
car's headlights. 31 According to the police officers, the complainant was 
hysterical, and "began to approach the two subjects on the ground 
screaming that they were the ones who had hurt her. "32 After these 
events, the complainant was taken to the emergency room where she 
was examined by Dr. Conway.33 
At trial, both police officers identified Bailey as the passenger and 
Mendrala as the driver. 34 The complainant identified Mendrala as the 
driver, but did not identify Bailey.JS Dr. Conway, the complainant's ex-
amining physician, testified that, when the complainant arrived at the 
hospital, her clothes were in disarray and her face was dirty and appeared 
tear-stained. 36 Dr. Conway further testified that the complainant had 
bruises on her wrists, knees and buttocks, and there was increased 
redness in her vaginal area. 37 He recorded her history and described her 
as emotionally upset. 38 After an extensive voir dire, Dr. Conway was 
asked, in each case over the defendants' objection, to form an opinion 
to a medical certainty as to the cause of the complainant's state when he 
examined her. 39 Dr. Conway responded by testifying that, based on his 
experience, the history, and the physical examination, the complainant 
was sexually assaulted.40 On cross-examination, Dr. Conway admitted 
that he could not have reached his conclusion solely on the basis of his 
physical examination of the victim.41 
After being convicted of indecent assault and battery and attempted 
rape, the defendants appealed claiming error in evidentiary rulings by 
the trialjudge.42 The Appeals Court held that the doctor's testimony was 
improperly admitted, and that the defendants were entitled to a new trial 
on this basis.43 The Appeals Court began its opinion by stating that where 
there are charges of sexual assault, the question of guilt or innocence 
31Jd. 
32Jd. 
33 Jd. at 402, 480 N.E.2d at 1041. 
34 /d. at 400, 480 N.E.2d at 1040. 
3S Jd. 





41 /d. He admitted that if the victim had "said she had fallen off her bike, the bruises that 
I found could be those caused by falling off a bicycle, that's true." Jd. at 404, 480 N.E.2d 
at 1043. 
42 /d. at 399, 480 N.E.2d at 1039. 
43 Jd. at 399-404, 480 N.E.2d at 1040-43. 
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rests in large part "upon whether the jury believed the victim's version 
of what happened or the defendant[s']."44 The unbiased testimony of an 
expert, the court noted, could substantially influence the jury's decision 
as to whom to believe.45 Therefore, the court held, an expert's opinion 
that there was a rape, could "possibly prejudice" the defendant.46 
Under current standards, the court further stated, expert testimony is 
admissible even if the expert's opinion touches on the ultimate issues 
that the jury must decide.47 The court stated the evidence is only admis-
sible, however, when the testimony is of assistance to the jury in reaching 
their decision.48 An expert may not, the court stated, "offer his opinion 
on issues that the jury are equally competent to assess, such as the 
credibility of witnesses. "49 Where such issues are present, the court 
noted, the influence of an expert's opinion may threaten the independence 
of the jury's decision. 5o 
Unless there are special factual circumstances, 51 the court held that an 
expert witness, no matter how well qualified, may not be asked directly 
whether a rape or sexual assault has occurred. 52 The court stated that 
"[s]uch a direct opinion ... [is] beyond the witness's appropriate prov-
ince as an expert witness."53 An expert, like the doctor in Gardner, the 
court noted, does not possess the skills or experience to determine that 
acts of intercourse amounted to rape. 54 As did the doctor in Gardner,55 
the court further analogized, Dr. Conway admitted that he could not have 
reached his opinion solely on the basis of his examination of the victim. 56 
Moreover, the court stated, the jury in this case, as in Gardner,51 "w[as] 
44 Id. at 402-03, 480 N.E.2d at 1041-42 (quoting Gardner, 350 Mass. at 667, 216 N.E.2d 
at 561). 
45 Id. at 403, 480 N.E.2d at 1042. 
46 Id. (citing Gardner, 350 Mass. at 667, 216 N.E.2d at 560-61). 
47 Id. (quoting Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 105, 431 N.E.2d 556, 566 (1982); citing 
Commonwealth v. Montmeny, 360 Mass. at 527-29, 276 N.E.2d at 689-90). 
48 Id. at 403, 480 N.E.2d at 1042. 
49 Id. (quoting Simon, 385 Mass. at 105, 431 N.E.2d at 566). 
50 Id. (citing Gardner, 350 Mass. at 667, 216 N.E.2d at 561). 
51 Id. at 404, 480 N.E.2d at 1042. The court noted that in certain cases involving children, 
expert testimony may be helpful. ld. at 404 n.7, 480 N.E.2d at 1042 n.7. 
52 Id. at 404, 480 N.E.2d at 1042. 
53 Id. (quoting Montmeny, 360 Mass. at 528, 276 N.E.2d at 690). 
54 Id. at 404, 480 N.E.2d at 1042-43. The court noted that there is an equal danger of 
enhancing the victim's testimony when the expert relates statements made by the com-
plainant, see Commonwealth v. Spare, 353 Mass. 263, 266, 230 N.E.2d 798, (1967), or 
bases his opinion on the history taken from the victim, see Commonwealth v. Russ, 232 
Mass. 58, 73-74, 122 N.E. 176 (1919). Both, the Mendrala court further noted, occurred 
in the case before it. Mendrala, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 404 n.8, 480 N.E.2d at 1043 n.8. 
55 350 Mass. at 665-66, 216 N.E.2d at 559-60. 
56 See supra note 41. 
57 350 Mass. 664, 216 N.E.2d 558. 
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equally capable of drawing the conclusion sought from an expert wit-
ness," and thus the doctor's testimony was improperly admitted.58 
Although the doctor's testimony was the deciding factor in granting 
the defendants a new trial, the court also ruled on the admissibility of 
the complainant's identification of her attackers. 59 The court stated that 
the testimony of the police officers, recounting the complainant's scream 
identifying the two men, was critical evidence. 60 The court then examined 
what impact the Daye61 decision should have on the issue. The Daye 
decision, the Mendrala court stated, prevents substantive use of an ex-
trajudicial identification unless the identifying witness acknowledges that 
the identification was made. 62 If such an acknowledgment cannot be 
made, according to the Mendrala court, the identification's "probative 
worth is outweighed by the hazard of error or falsity in reporting. "63 
Because the complainant failed to make an acknowledgment, 64 the court 
reasoned, the identification could not qualify under the exception to the 
hearsay rule set forth in Daye. 65 
In spite of the fact that the identification could not be admitted under 
the Daye analysis, the court ruled that it could be admitted under the 
spontaneous utterance exception to the hearsay rule. 66 Nothing in Daye, 
the court noted, precludes an identification whose reliability is established 
by another exception to the hearsay rule. 67 The Mendrala court ruled 
that the trial judge had discretion to admit this identification, which 
appeared to be "instinctual" and not "contrived and calculated," as a 
spontaneous exclamation. 68 Because there was sufficient evidence of the 
pre-trial identification, the court held that the denial of the defendant's 
motion for a not guilty verdict was proper.69 
' 8 Mendrala, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 404, 480 N.E.2d at 1043. 
'
9 ld. at 400-01, 480 N.E.2d at 1040-41. 
60 Id. at 400, 480 N.E.2d at 1040. 
61 393 Mass. 55, 469 N.E.2d 483 (1984). 
62 Mendrala, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 400-01, 480 N.E.2d at 1040-41. 
63 Id. at 401, 480 N.E.2d at 1041 (quoting Daye, 393 Mass. at 61, 469 N.E.2d at 488, 
quoting McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive Evidence, 
25 TEX. L. REV. 573, 588 (1947). 
64 See supra note 14. 
65 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 401, 480 N.E.2d at 1041. 
66 ld. 
67 Id. 
68 ld. In order to be admitted as a spontaneous utterance, the utterance "must have been 
before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent .... It is to be observed that the 
statements need not be strictly contemporaneous with the exciting cause; they may be 
subsequent to it, provided there has not been time for the exciting influence to Jose its 
sway and to be dissipated .... [T]here can be no definite and fixed limit of time. Each 
case must depend on its own circumstances." Commonwealth v. Hampton, 351 Mass. 447, 
449, 221 N.E.2d 766, 767 (1966). 
69 Mendrala, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 402, 480 N.E.2d at 1041. 
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Mendrala is significant in two respects. First, the decision reaffirms 
the long-standing principal of Massachusetts law that an expert may not 
be asked directly, at trial, whether a person has suffered a rape or other 
sexual assault. Second, Mendrala clarifies the Daye standard for the 
admissibility of extrajudicial identifications by holding that such an iden-
tification may be admitted through the use of a hearsay exception other 
than the one outlined in Daye. 
The Mendrala court properly respected the jury's fact-finding role70 
and the limits of expert testimony. Part of the jury's function is to listen 
to the testimony from the victim, the defendant, experts and other wit-
nesses to determine the ultimate issues of whether a rape or sexual assault 
occurred and whether the defendant committed it. The question of the 
defendant's guilt or innocence rests in large part upon whether the jury 
believes the victim's version of what happened or the defendant's ver-
sion. 71 If a doctor were allowed to offer a direct opinion that a rape or 
sexual assault occurred, the independence of the jury's opinion surely 
would be affected. 72 Furthermore, the admission of the expert's testi-
mony as to whether a rape or sexual assault occurred could result in 
improper prejudice to the defendant. 73 It is probable that a jury would 
regard questions put to a doctor as to whether a rape occurred as tan-
tamount to asking the expert if, in his opinion, the defendant was guilty. 74 
Moreover, the role of the expert witness is to help the jury understand 
issues of fact beyond their common experience.75 An expert witness, 
therefore, may not offer an opinion on issues that the jury is equally 
competent to assess. 76 If a doctor were allowed to offer a direct opinion 
on whether a rape had occurred, he or she clearly would be outside of 
his or her province as an expert.77 The doctor, moreover, improperly 
would be giving his or her opinion based on factors outside the area of 
his or her professional competence. 78 Although a doctor is able to deter-
mine that sexual intercourse took place, the doctor is no more capable 
than the jury of determining whether this act of intercourse was consented 
to or not. Consent cannot be ascertained from a physical examination of 
the complainant. Where the jury is equally competent of reaching the 
conclusion sought from a doctor or other expert witnesses, the expert's 
70 See, e.g., Simon v. Solomon, 385 Mass. 91, 105, 431 N.E.2d 556, 566 (1982). 
71 Gardner, 350 Mass. at 667, 216 N.E.2d at 561. 
72 See, e.g., Simon, 385 Mass. at 105, 431 N.E.2d at 566. 
73 See, e.g., Gardner, 350 Mass. at 667, 216 N.E.2d at 560-61. 
74 /d. at 666, 216 N.E.2d at 560. 
7
' See Simon, 385 Mass. at 105, 431 N.E.2d at 566. 
76fd. 
77 Montmeny, 360 Mass. at 528, 276 N.E.2d at 690. 
78 See supra note 12. 
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testimony should be inadmissible.79 Therefore, because the ultimate issue 
was beyond the doctor's province to decide, and because of the possible 
prejudice to the defendant, the Mendrala court was correct in disallowing 
the direct questioning of the doctor as to whether a sexual assault had 
occurred. Consequently, Mendrala reaffirms that practicing Massachu-
setts attorneys cannot directly ask an expert whether an alleged victim 
has suffered a rape or sexual assault. 
The Mendrala court's ruling on the admissibility of an extrajudicial 
identification is also a significant development in Massachusetts evidence 
law. Mendrala states that the testimony by a person other than the 
identifying witness concerning an extrajudicial identification can be ad-
missible for its probative worth, even when the witness does not ac-
knowledge the identification, as long as it comes within another recog-
nized exception to the hearsay rule. 80 By stating that such an 
identification can be admitted under a hearsay exception other than the 
stated exception in Daye, the Mendrala court effectively clarified the 
scope of the Daye decision. 
The Mendrala ruling on the identification issue was proper. The defen-
dants in Mendrala argued that the Daye decision precludes the admission 
of hearsay identifications, unless the identification is acknowledged at 
trial by the person who made the identification.81 In response, the Men-
drala court correctly pointed out that nothing in Daye precludes the use 
of another hearsay exception for having the extrajudicial identification 
admitted. 82 The Daye court never mentioned the possibility that another 
exception may be used but rather restricted its holding to admitting into 
evidence an extrajudicial identification where a witness acknowledges 
making such an identification. 83 By stating that other permissible hearsay 
exceptions can be used to admit extrajudicial identifications, the court 
effectively cleared up any confusion that the 1984 Daye decision may 
have created. Thus, because other exceptions are not precluded by Daye, 
the Mendrala court was correct in allowing the trial judge to use his 
discretion in admitting the identification under the spontaneous utterance 
exception to the hearsay rule. Furthermore, because the complainant 
was hysterical and made her identification immediately after the incident 
occurred, the trial judge's use of the spontaneous utterance rule clearly 
was warranted. 84 Consequently, Massachusetts attorneys can use Men-
79 See Gardner, 350 Mass. at 667, 216 N.E.2d at 560. 
80 Mendrala, 20 Mass. App. Ct. at 400-01, 480 N.E.2d at 1040-41. 
8
' Id. at 400, 480 N.E.2d at 1040. 
82 Id. at 401, 480 N.E.2d at 1041. 
83 Daye, 393 Mass. at 60-61, 469 N.E.2d at 487-88. 
84 See supra note 68. 
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drala as their basis for admitting an extrajudicial identification under any 
permissible hearsay exception. 
In sum, the Mendrala decision has affected two areas of Massachusetts 
law. First, Mendrala appropriately reaffirmed the principle that an expert 
witness, basing his opinion on factors other than a physical examination 
of the victim, may not be asked directly whether a rape or other sexual 
assault has occurred. In addition, the Mendrala court effectively elimi-
nated any confusion surrounding the Daye decision in holding that Daye 
does not preclude the admission of an extrajudicial identification through 
the use of a hearsay exception other than the one outlined in Daye. 
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